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ignorant or incompetent, that it is rarely possible, on adequate grounds, conscien-
tiously to stamp the misrepresentation as morally culpable; and still less could
law presume to interfere with this land of controversial misconduct.87
James J. Cook*
8 7 M iL, ON LmErTY 47 (Blackwell ed. 1947), noted in Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 272
n.13.
, Member, Second Year Class.
THE MEDICAL PROFESSION AND STRICT LIABILITY FOR
DEFECTIVE PRODUCTS-A LIMITED EXTENSION
"The cases on product liability are emerging as early chapters of a modem
history on strict liability that will take long in the writing."' This note will consider
whether an extension of strict liability for defective products to the medical profes-
sion is a feasible chapter m this history. Should the doctor he held strictly liable
when a defect in the drug, organic human product, or surgical insert he administers
to his patient causes harm?2
The facts of Inouye v. Black3 may be helpful as an illustration of the particular
area this note will cover. A physician wired together two of plaintiffs cervical ver-
tebrae. The wire later shattered, with the fragments migrating to various parts of
the spinal area, necessitating surgical removal. The wires had been expected to
break, but not to the extent that resulted nor in the time in which the actual frag-
mentation took place. There was thus a strong probability that the wire was de-
fective. The patient sued the doctor on the ground of negligence but failed to
recover. The court reasoned that no negligence could be found on the part of the
doctor because all facts indicated that the wire was defective, rather than that the
physician had been careless. Now, if the additional assumption is made that the
manufacturer of the wire is not amenable to suit, what relief has the patient in
this case for the injury done to him? That he has suffered harm is beyond doubt.
However he cannot recover against the doctor, for he has not been negligent, and
he cannot sue the manufacturer on the basis of strict liability for product defects
unless he can bring an action in a jurisdiction where the manufacturer is amenable
to suit. Why not compare the doctor to a retailer of goods and allow direct recov-
ery against him on strict liability for product defects? If the hospital is the entity
which has supplied the goods the same result could follow by analogy, in a suit
1 Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32
TENN. L. RBv. 363, 376 (1965).
2 Professnal charitable work, or treatment performed in charitable hospitals, is
not here considered, due to the special rules of law which have developed around such
institutions. See 15 Am. Jun. 2D Charities §§ 148, 152, 153, 154, 156 (1964).
3 238 A.C.A. 36, 47 Cal. Rptr. 313 (1965).
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against the hospital. This note is a consideration of the feasibility of such a suit and
a discussion of the inherent problems and their possible solutions.
Requisites for Recovery in Products Liability
For any plaintiff to recover for injuries caused by defective products, he must
show a duty to himself wich has been breached by the defendant, causing the
resultant injury.4 Let us consider the bases under which such a duty may be im-
posed in products liability There are two main areas in wich the duty arises: the
contract area of implied and express warranties 5 and the tort area of strict liability
for product defects.6 Since there would seem to be no sales contract involved m the
subject being considered, the sales warranties in the contract area are not appli-
cable7 and need not be considered.
The tort duty not to supply defective products is of a different nature from that
of sales warranties. It devolves upon anyone who sells or supplies a product. Justice
Traynor, m the case of Greenman v. Yuba Power Products Inc.,8 states: "[Tihe
recognition that the liability is not assumed by agreement but imposed by law
[makes] clear that the liability is not one governed by the law of contract war-
ranties but by the law of strict liability in tort."9 The duty not to supply defective
products stands alone, unaffected by contractual disclaimers, privity requirements,
or other contractual rules.10 It is not sustained by any contractual agreement, ex-
press or implied, but is a duty imposed by law on the supplier of the product be-
cause of the relationsip between him and the injured party as a result of his station
m the channel of distribution.i The duty is not owed merely to the immediate
parties to an agreement but runs to any user or consumer of the product.i2
It is to be noted that the duty imposed on the supplier of a product has no,
connotation of moral fault or blame.13 Legal fault is the only consideration of im-
portance.
4 PiiossER, TORTs 4-5 (3d ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as PrtossERI.
5 Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954); Gile v.
Kennewick Pub. Hosp. Dist., 48 Wash. 2d 774, 296 P.2d 662 (1956); CAL. Comm.
CODE §§ 2313-15.6 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377
P.2d 897 (1962); Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129
(1965).
7 Cf. Perlnutter v. Beth David Hosp., 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954).
8 59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897 (1962).
9 Id. at 63, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701, 377 P.2d at 901.
10 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377
P.2d 897 (1962).
i See cases cited note 6 supra. See also PnossEm 651, Ashe, So You're Going to Try
a Products Liability Case, 13 HAsamqrs L.J. 66 (1961).
12 Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 391 P.2d 168
(1964); Greenman v. Yuba Power Products Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377
P.2d 897 (1962); Canifax v. Hercules Powder Co., 237 A.C.A. 50, 46 Cal. Rptr. 552
(1965); La Hue v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 50 Wash. 2d 64, 314 P.2d 421 (1957).
i3 PRosSER at 508 states: "[Tlhe last 100 years has seen a general acceptance of
the principle that in some cases the defendant may be held liable, although he is not
only charged with no moral wrongdoing, but has not even departed in any way from a
reasonable standard of intent or care."
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The Retailer and Products Liability
In Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co.,14 both the manufacturer and the retailer of
an automobile were held strictly liable for a defect in the automobile which caused
injury to the buyer and his passenger. The court suggested that the manufacturer,
wholesaler, and retailer would all be liable to the injured consumer. Liability is
imposed on the retailer because he is in the business of distributing goods for
profits and thus should bear the risk of losses caused by defects m those products.
Furthermore, the retailer is in a position to do something about the defects by
exerting pressure on the manufacturer. Again, Piercefield v. Remihgton Arms Co.'5
indicates that the injured party can recover from either the retailer or the manufac-
turer because the retailer and manufacturer can control defects and are able to bear
the loss by shifting it back upon the market as a whole. The same reasoning has
been used to hold the wholesaler strictly liable.16
One of the principal bases for the imposition of strict liability is the retailer's
theoretical ability to allocate the risk of harm from defective products to the area of
the population which should bear it.17 Through strict liability, the risk of injury is
theoretically returned to the industry which has created the risk, and from there it
is distributed among the public at large in the form of price additions.I8 This is
deemed preferable to a limited distribution among the persons actually injured.
When recovery is obtained against a retailer he may recoup his loss from the man-
ufacturer on the rationale that the manufacturer is better able, and ought, to bear
any such loss, as he is the one responsible for it by virtue of the fact that he placed
the product in distribution channels.19
A second reason for imposing strict liability for defective products is that the
retailer, wholesaler, or manufacturer is assumed by law to have been adequately
paid to take the risk of defective products by the compensation received from
being in business and by denvmg a profit from sales.20 The distributor makes a
profit from his sales of products, and he should bear the risk of any defects in those
products which cause injury. 2' The consumer has good reason to believe he is buy-
mg a product which is fit to be used, or he would not have purchased it.
A third reason for imposing strict liability is the inequality of distribution of
power in the distributing process. The retailer is said to be able, through pressure
14 61 Cal. 2d 256, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 391 P.2d 168 (1964).
"G 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129 (1965). While the opinion discusses warranties,
it is clearly based upon strict liability m tort.
1 Canifax v. Hercules Powder Co., 237 A.C.A. 50, 46 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1965).
17 James, Products Liability, 34 TEXAS L. REv. 192 (1955) states: "In modem
context, strict liability for accidental harm tends to distribute fairly equitably the in-
evitable casualities of enterprise." See also PRossEn at 673; Notes, 2 KAN. L. REV. 188,
189-92 (1953); 103 U. PA. L. REv. 833, 835 (1955).
1 Authorities cited note 17 supra.
19Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 A.C. 1, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 403 P.2d 145 (1965);
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897
(1962); Canifax v. Hercules Powder Co., 237 A.C.A. 50, 46 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1965)
(retailers dismissed or not joined when manufacturer amenable to suit).2 0 Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 391 P.2d 168
(1964); PnossEa 673; James, supra note 17, at 222.
21 Ibid.
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on the manufacturer, to demand more care in preventing defects, 22 by refusing to
purchase from a manufacturer of defective products. The consumer is not in such
an advantageous position. Often he must purchase what he needs from whom he
can, with no hope of forcing the manufacturer to exercise more care. The retailer
and manufacturer are deemed better able to bear the risk of a defective product
in that they are in a position to do something about it, while the injured consumer
can do very little.23
Granting the liability of the retailer and its justification, to whom is he liable?
The most obvious party to whom this duty is owed is the buyer.24 However the
retailer's liability is not merely to the buyer. It may extend to users and consumers
remote from the buyer-retailer relationship.25 He has even been held liable for
personal injuries to an innocent bystander who is injured when a defective product
in the hands of a user causes harm.26 It appears that the courts, with some vana-
tions, impose strict liability for product ddfects wherever there is a substantial fore-
seeability of injury if the product is defective, as evidenced by the fact that present
law tends to reject limiting the benefits of strict liability to the purchaser.27
Mention must be made here of the fact that in many cases the retailer is dis-
missed, or not even ]omed, in a suit for strict liability for product defects when the
manufacturer is found to be available and able to pay a judgment.28 Thus M
Greenman,29 the court realized that the primary duty in this area was upon the
manufacturer and dismissed the retailer as a person only secondarily liable. In a
typical case, the retailer may be held liable along with the manufacturer to assure
the plaintiff his recovery,30 but between the retailer and the manufacturer, the
latter must reimburse the former for any loss he suffers.31
2 2 James, supra note 17, at 199 and at 222, where he states: "He [the retailer]
profits from the transaction and is in a fairly strategic position to promote safety through
pressure on his supplier. Also, he is known to hIs customers and subject to their suits,
while the maker is often unknown and may well be beyond the process of any court
convenient to the customer. Moreover, the retailer is in a good position to pass back the
loss to hIs supplier." Cf. Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 37 Cal. Rptr.
896, 319 P.2d 168 (1964).
23 "ITjhere are enough cases where the manufacturer is beyond the jurisdiction, or
even unknown to the injured plaintiff, to justify giving the consumer the maximum
of protection " Possza 682. See also Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 A.C. 1, 45 Cal.
Rptr. 17, 403 P.2d 145 (1965); Ashe, supra note 11. Cf. James, supra note 17, at 223.
24 Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 37 Cal. lptr. 896, 391 P.2d
168 (1964).25 Canifax v. Hercules Powder Co., 237 A.C.A. 50, 46 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1965); Rod-
nguez v. Shell's City Inc., 141 So. 2d 590 (Fla. 1962) (dictum); Goldberg v. Kolsman
Inst. Co., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592, 191 N.E.2d 81 (1963).26 Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129 (1965).
27 lbtd. (illustrating how far extension has progressed). See also Canifax v. Hercules
Powder Co., 237 A.C.A. 50, 46 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1965).28 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377
P.2d 897 (1962); Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 A.C. 1, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 403 P.2d
145 (1965).
2959 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897 (1962).
30 Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 391 P.2d 168
(1964).
31 Cf. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697,
377 P.2d 897 (1962) (manufacturer held and retailer dismissed).
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Can Analogy Be Made between Retailer and Doctor-
In the fact situation here considered a doctor has administered a drug, organic
human product, surgical insert or an appliance upon the patient, thereby vesting
the patient with a property interest in the product used.32 The doctor is compen-
sated for these products as part of hIs medical charges (at least where he, rather
than the hospital, furnishes the product). In this manner, any prerequisite of a
conveyance before inposition of strict liability for product defects has been satis-
fied. Therein is established the basis for examination of both the rationale under-
lying imposition of strict liability on the retailer and the applicability of the
rationale to the doctor's situation.33
The first reason for imposmg strict liability for defective products is that the
persons m the chain of distribution of any product are better able to transmit the
risk of harm from defective products back to the manufacturer.3 4 If the manufac-
turer is available for suit, the patient, like the consumer, would have a direct action
against him. However, if the manufacturer is not accessible, the doctor could, if
required to compensate for the loss, return the loss to the manufacturer either
through an action in his own name or through his liability insurer, which would pay
the loss and be subrogated to the doctor's action against the manufacturer.35 In
most cases the manufacturer will be available for suit, and the doctor may be dis-
missed or not joined.3 6 The doctor would thus be secondarily liable because of his
station in the chain of distribution. The doctor's ability to shift the loss back to
the manufacturer seems as potent as the ability of other transferors of goods. The
injured patient, however, can do nothing but bear his loss if the manufacturer is
not amenable to suit or if the doctor is not strictly liable.
The second reason for application of strict liability is that the remuneration
a product transferor receives from hIs business is said to have compensated him for
the risks mcident to that business. 37 Among these risks is that of injury caused by
a defective product. The doctor is in business for a profit; once divorced from the
humanitarian citadel in which he is often placed, the doctor may be seen to work
for pecumary compensation. The products a doctor administers in the practice
of medicine are certainly more than merely mcidental to the service performed.
The result of a doctor's work may directly depend upon the quality of the products
he transfers to the patient. Like the consumer, the patient has little choice between
products. Logical consistency would indicate that if a person transfers products as
3 2 As in Bowles v. Zimmer Mfg. Co., 277 F.2d 868 (7th Cir. 1960) and Inouye v.
Black, 238 A.C.A. 36, 47 Cal. Rptr. 313 (1965), where the insert was supplied by the
hospital.
33 See Farnsworth, Implied Warranties of Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57 COLum.
L. REv. 653, 667-69 (1957), on the advantages of reasoning by analogy in non-sales
cases. The three primary advantages are: (1) greater care in adjusting legal rules to
social change; (2) avoidance of application of sales rules that have no place in non-
sales cases; and (3) the fact that it is useful to extend strict liability to many cases
which are like sales but cannot be defined as sales.
34 See authorities cited note 22 supra.
35 Cf. Offer v. Superior Court, 194 Cal. 114, 228 P. 11 (1924); London Assur. Co.
v. Anderson, 194 Cal. App. 2d 418, 15 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1961).36 See Greenman v. Yuba Power Products Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697,
377 P.2d 897 (1962) (analogous retailer case).
37 See authorities cited notes 20-21 supra.
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a part of his business, he should be strictly liable for defects in those products
because he has been compensated for any such risk by being paid. Note that this
compensation is not for the ultimate risk of injury itself, for this risk is on the
manufacturer. Rather, it is compensation for bearing the limited risk of being sec-
ondarily liable.38
The third reason for the application of strict liability for product defects is
that there is inequality between the parties as to ability to prevent defects in
products.8 9 It may be doubted whether any dispenser of products on a retail level
is in an effective position to prevent defects m products. However, the doctor ap-
pears to be in a better position than a patient. By economic pressure the doctor can,
to a certain extent, stimulate greater care in production, for he can choose what
brand of medical product he wishes to purchase. The patient has no such power; he
must accept the product the doctor offers because he is not normally qualified to
determine the quality of medical products. The patient has even less power in this
regard than does the consumer who, in most cases, has at least some basis upon
which to evaluate the quality of the product. If the criterion of ability to prevent
risks or defects has validity, it would apply to others in intermediate positions
within distributive chains.
The Doctor-Patient Relationship
Strict liability in tort for product defects rests entirely on a duty imposed by
law as a result of the relationship between the parties. It must be determined at
this point whether there are any factors m the reasons for strict liability which
preclude its extension to the medical profession.
In terms of remoteness of the recovering party from the party r~coverd against,
the relationship of doctor-patient seems quite close, and the possibility of injury is
certainly not unforeseeable. Strict liability is mposed by law because of the rela-
tionship of the parties, and the doctor-patient relationslup is undoubtedly closer
in terms of personal trust and confidence than is that of the retailer-buyer.40
Secondly, there is no requirement of moral blame or fault in a strict liability
recovery.41 Thus, there can be no objection to the lack of moral blame where the
injury has occurred in a doctor-patient context. The relationship of a doctor and
patient is sufficently close for many duties to be imposed.42 If one of these duties
were that of admmistermg only defect-free products, it would be consistent with
the closeness of the relationship, and a breach thereof would not necessarily con-
note blameworthiness.
A consideration ox both the consumer-retailer and the doctor-patient relation-
ships reveals that both the consumer and the patient rely on the respective trans-
ferors of products to them. The extent to which this reliance is justified is an im-
portant consideration. The consumer expects that when he purchases a product it
will be free from defects; otherwise he would not purchase it. The patient also
38 See authorities cited note 23 supra.
39 See authorities cited note 22 supra.
40 The consumer simply purchases or uses a product purchased from a retailer. The
patient is quite closely related to hIs doctor in that the doctor works upon the body of the
patient.41 PnossE 508.
42 For example, the duty not to injure the patient negligently and the duty not to
divulge confidential information.
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relies on his doctor to transfer a defect-free product to him. The element of trust
and reliance is, if anything, greater in the instance of a doctor-patient relationship
than is that between the retailer and the consumer. The doctor-patient relationship,
by its very nature, should permit the law to impose a higher standard of conduct
upon the doctor, and strict liability for defective products would be consistent with
this standard.43
The contract between the parties is important, not as a source of liability, but
as a source of the relationship between the parties as a result of which the law
imposes a duty. In this respect the service contract of the doctor imposes at least
as valid a criterion for the imposition of a legal duty as the sales contract of a
retailer. A duty of reasonable care is owed to a patient under a service contract
for medical aid. The parties to a medical service contract are certainly not remote.
By contrast, where a sales contract is concerned, a duty may be imposed on the
basis of a relationship between parties who are not even in pnvity.44
Can the Extension of Strict Liability for Product Defects Be Made to Physicians?
The writer has been unable to locate a single case brought under strict liability
in tort for product defects involving a doctor sued by his patient.45 Let us examine
and analyze the objections to the imposition of strict liability.
The first objection to extending strict liability for product defects is that the
humanitarian nature of the doctor's work is mconsistent with such liability. Phy-
sicians today are regarded very differently from the retailer. An aura of human-
itanan effort comparable to few other professions surrounds the work of a doctor.46
The contemporary public is amazed at the development of modern medicine and
tends to regard the doctor with awe and respect. It is generally felt that the doc-
tor's efforts help the patient and preserve hIs life and do not involve the commercial
factor necessary for the imposition of strict liability for product defects.
Intermingled with the humanitarian doctrine are the reputation and status
which a doctor holds in society. A physician commands a high mche in our present
scale of social and occupational merit. He is regarded as a professional man of the
highest standards, devoted to the welfare of humanity and the curing of its ills.
It is generally felt that any recovery in a court of law against the doctor has a very
damaging effect on his reputation and that no liability should be imposed upon him
unless he is actually at fault in a moral sense, i.e., when he is negligently or inten-
tionally guilty of malpractice. It might be argued that strict liability for product
defects would be considered a form of malpractice, thus impairing a physician's
reputation even though he is morally blameless. While the retailer can be sued
43 Cf. Cushing v. Rodman, 82 F.2d 864 (D.C. Cir. 1936); James, supra note 17,
at 222.44 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377
P.2d 897 (1962); Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129
(1965).
4 5 An example of a case where the proposed extension would seem to permit a
patient recovery but where no recovery was granted on a negligence basis is Inouye
v. Black, 238 A.C.A. 36, 47 Cal. Rptr. 313 (1965).
46 See Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954), illus-
trating the "personal help, not sale" view. See also Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of
.Defective Products and Strct Liability, 32 TmNN. L. REv. 363, 367-70 (1965).
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without any material damage to his reputation,47 any suit at all might damage the
reputation of a-doctor.
The second objection is that the law has developed a degree of insulation
around the practice of medicine which protects it from damage liability. Strict
liability might hamper the doctor in his work by making him less able or less
willing to experiment with new procedures which could be of substantial benefit
to medical progress. Any liability over and above that to which he is now subject
would stifle medical progress. The doctor must be free to take certain risks and to
use certain untried products in the interest of medical advancement.
The third objection is that the extension of strict liability in tort for product
defects seems to have been halted by a requirement of a sale.48 Case law 9 and
the Restatement of Torts5 ° still require a sale, though the recovery itself is based
not on the sale but on a duty imposed by law.51
The burden on the doctor of obtaining and paying for liability insurance has
also been thrown onto the scale of arguments against the proposed extension. It
has been contended that the burden of the increased price of liability insurance
would raise the price of medical care to prohibitive limits. 2 This is said to out-
weigh any gains that may accrue to the public from holding the doctor strictly
liable.
Another possible argument is that holding a doctor strictly liable would increase
the multiplicity of suits, for the doctor would be forced to sue the manufacturer to
recover his loss. One purported advantage of strict liability is decreasing multiplicity
by allowing an injured party to sue the manufacturer directly, and this effect might
be destroyed by holding a doctor strictly liable.8 3
Let us examine these objections to the proposed extension to ascertain their
true weight. While it may be admitted that the practice of medicine has great
humanitarian appeal and that the doctor may believe that he is contributing toward
the welfare of humanity in a way which no retailer could match,54 the basc fact
remains that most doctors are in business for monetary compensation. 55 They
derive profits from their professional activities, as do the retailers. This is evidenced
by the fact that the income of doctors is among the highest of any profession. The
47 The retailer's reputation is not as vulnerable because he is concerned wholly with
commercial matters, not normally with such personal matters as the power of life or death
over a patient. The doctor, while in business for a profit, often has a life dependent on
his skill. Possible future patients wish to entrust their lives to only the doctor with an
unimpeachable reputation.48 Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 A.C. 1, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 403 P.2d 145 (1965);
Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 391 P.2d 168 (1964);
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897
(1962).49 Cases cited note 48 supra.
50 RESTATEmENT (SEcoND), TonTs, § 402A (1965).
51 See authorities cited note 11 supra.
52 Interview with Dean William L. Prosser, in San Francisco, Nov. 8, 1965.
53 Cf. Harry Gill Co. v. Superior Court, 238 A.C.A. 781, 48 Cal. Rptr. 93 (1965).
54 See Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954);
Gile v. Kennewick Pub. Hosp. Dist., 48 Wash. 2d 774, 296 P.2d 662 (1956). These cases
show the court's feeling that the medical profession helps a patient for humanitarian,
not commercial, motives.
55 Crutchett v. Lawton, 139 Cal. App. 411, 33 P.2d 839 (1934).
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average doctor can expect to make well over 10,000 dollars a year from his work,
whch is a far cry from the average retailer's expected income. 56 A doctor also
charges patients for the goods used as part of their treatments (except those sup-
plied by a hospital). These medical products also help the doctor make his profit
by rendering his assistance more sure of beneficial results. Few persons would
patronize a doctor who refused to use drugs or surgical inserts for physical treat-
ment. The fact that the physician may enjoy his work and may deem it valuable
to humanity should not obscure the fact that he is working for business profits and
is engaged in a commercial venture. The two factors are not mutually exclusive.
There is, however, some danger of actions m strict liability for product defects
damaging a doctor's reputation. The term malpractice is an unfortunate one as it
connotes incompetence or dereliction of duty on the part of the doctor. Therefore,
if recovery on the basis of strict liability is in any way equated with malpractice,
the effect on the doctor's reputation could be serious. One solution to this problem
might be a refusal to categorize a strict-liability recovery against the doctor as
malpractice. The recovery, if one is granted, should be called strict liability for
defective products and should not bear a label which would tend to connote blame.
The medical profession should not attach any stigma to such a suit in light of the.
true basis for recovery. However, the important problem may be the effect of such
a suit on the doctor's public reputation. As to this, it may be surmised that there
would be a nmmum of suits for the manufacturer would bear primary liability.st
Pre-tnal settlements will also avoid part of this problem by eliminating the publicity
inherent in a public trial. Thus, damage to reputation could be minimized. Never-
theless, in a very real sense, the doctor's reputation is exposed and subjected to
damage from suits to a greater extent than is that of the retailer.
Damage to reputation could be minimzed by use of the above means. An edu-
cational process impressing the public with the true nature of such suits would
also be beneficial. Any policy judgment here, however, must be a value judgment.
In the opmion of the writer, placing the loss of the patient's injury on the manu-
facturer, through the process of holding the doctor strictly liable, would outweigh
possible damage to the doctor's reputation. A public interest which demands the
best protection for a consumer should demand equal protection for a patient to
whom a product is passed, even if there is some risk to the reputation of the
doctor.58
Would the imposition of strict liability hamper the doctor's work? If so, the
proposed extension is flawed. However, strict liability for product defects does not
seem to have hampered the business of the average retailer. The retailer has simply
considered such liability a cost of doing business. It is not an excessive cost because,
as stated, the primary liability is on the manufacturer. 59 It must be remembered
5 6 STATsTcAL ABsTRAcT oF THE UriTrm STATEs 230 (1965) states that the average
income per year of a physician in 1959 exceeded $10,000, compared to the average
figure for the retailer or wholesaler for the same period of only $6,067.57 Bowles v. Zimmer Mfg. Co., 277 F.2d 868 (7th Cir. 1960); Gottsdanker v.
Cutter Laboratories, 182 Cal. App. 2d 602, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1960); cf. Greenman v.
Yuba Power Products Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897 (1962).
58 Cf. PaossER 673 (public interest and safety demand best protection for con-
sumer); Note, 13 STAN. L. REv. 645 (1960).
59 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377
P.2d 897 (1962).
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that strict liability applies only to a defective product, 60 and an expernmental or
risky product is not necessarily defective. As an example, rabies vaccine may
produce very unpleasant effects, but it is not necessarily defective. Medical prod-
ucts which involve an element of risk are not defective simply because the risk is
present. It would not seem that strict liability would hamper prompt and enthu-
siastic medical services, since the doctor would, without opening himself to strict
liability, still be free to try drugs or medical products which involve risk. The doctor
would still have liberty to take risks and use untried products in cases where neces-
sary, as long as the patient is warned of the risk and as long as such products were
produced with no hazards other than those inherent in their nature.61
The requirement of a scale for the application of strict liability for product
defects seems to be a way in which the applicability of strict liability is limited,
even though liability for product defects is imposed by law, not by the sales agree-
ment.62 While a sale may be used as a criterion for the imposition of a duty by the
law, the inposition is not dependent upon that critenon,63 and a sale should not
be necessary for the imposition of strict liability for product defects. It is the rela-
tionshtp between the parties, not the sale, that is important.
The burden of increased liability insurance upon the doctor does not seem to
be an insurmountable problem. This burden on retailers has not been a substantial
factor in raising prices. Likewise it should not raise the price of medical aid. The
insurance, it must be emphasized, will not be insurance against complete loss, but
only against the risk of the doctor being held as a conduit to place the loss on the
manufacturer. 64 The cost of the doctor's insurance would be the increased costs of
a recovery through, not against, the doctor.
As to multiplicity of suits, the action against the retailer is subject to the same
objections, yet it has not deterred the courts from holding the retailer strictly
liable. The doctor, like the retailer, may be dismissed when the manufacturer is
amenable to suit and able to respond in damages. 65 Thus, the proposed extension
would not foster multiplicity any more than the present liability of a retailer. The
writer believes multiplicity should be discouraged, but not at the price of denying
a remedy for an injury.
Conclusion
In view of the foregoing material, the extension of strict liability for product
defects to the doctor looms as a possible development in the law of torts. There are
problems, but they do not seem to outweigh the desirability of compensating a pa-
tient for an injury he has received. The patient should not be required to choose the
party who is primarily liable and go without remedy if that party is not amenable
to suit in his jurisdiction, and the patient cannot afford to sue hn elsewhere.
60 "[Tlhere is no strict liability unless the product was in some way defective when
it was sold by the defendant." PaossER 683.61 For example, a contaminant might be considered an extraordinary hazard, so the
experunental product could be found defective.62 See authorities cited note 12 supra.
63 Ibid.
64 See authorities cited notes 23 and 24 supra.
65 Cf. Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 A.C. 1, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 403 P.2d 145 (1965);
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897
(1962); Harry Gill Co. v. Superior Court, 238 A.C.A. 781, 48 Cal. Rptr. 93 (1965).
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